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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a growing interest for the economic analysis of universities in the academic
literature. Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (1998), for example, studies the reaction of universities to
financial incentives in terms of grading and admission policies. Kanagaretman et al. (2003)
investigates the effect of student evaluations on teaching quality. Some works are most concerned
with the public regulation of higher education markets when the competition between universities
becomes fiercer. This is the case of Del Rey (2001) and Gautier and Wauthy (2004) which study
the role of financial incentives in the decision to teach or research when there is competition
for funds among universities (the former) or departments within universities (the latter). De
Fraja and Iossa (2002) studies competition between universities leading to the emergence of an
elite institution. Other authors have studied optimal pricing in higher education (Rothschild
and White, 1995) or the optimal allocation of students in the presence of borrowing constraints
(Fernandez, 1998). Some additional examples can be found in Dewatripont et al (2001).
This paper studies the decentralized choice of universities facing the decision to launch a
new program at the graduate level (a master or a doctoral program) when students’ enrollment
decisions are affected by network effects.
In most european countries, higher education systems are organized as quasi-markets where
highly regulated education providers compete for students. It is not surprising that quasi-
markets generate inefficiencies once it is recognized that universities’ objectives may differ from
those of a social planner. In this paper, we focus on the inefficiencies that can be associated
with the existence of network externalities on student utility.
In order to do that, we consider two universities teaching undergraduate programs of different
quality. Teaching staff is paid according to a given market rate. These universities face two
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options with respect to the organization of the new graduate program. Either they choose to
launch a master program or they decide to launch a doctoral program. Those programs differ
in three fundamental respects. First, they differ in cost, because a doctoral program needs
professors with high scientific records (who, we assume, require higher wages). Second, they
may correspond to different objectives for the universities. In particular, while the university
is more concerned by the quality of the students it enrolls in a doctoral program, fees collected
on enrolled students are more important in a master program. Third, the utility of students
enrolling in master or doctoral program may differ. In particular, it is likely that network effects
related to research spillovers are more prevalent within a doctoral program.
We shall propose a simple model that builds on these differences and study the optimal
decision of universities as a two-stage game where they choose first which program to launch
and second which students to admit into the program. To this end, they select applicants
by setting a minimum admission grade.1 Given these strategies, each student, belonging to a
population of heterogeneous individuals, chooses where to enroll.
As we have said, the main assumption underlying our work is the existence of the network
effect: we assume indeed that the quality of a doctoral program, as evaluated by the students,
depends positively on the number of students enrolled in the program. This positive network
effect reflects the existence of research spillovers which enhance the productivity of the students’
work when they can interact with colleague-students who share similar interests. Accordingly,
the ex-post quality of a doctoral program depends on the size of the program itself.
In order to take full advantage of this externality, all students enrolling in a doctoral program
should enroll in the same one. However, the presence of a positive network externality induces
1Accordingly, we do not allow for fee competition. This assumption is acknowledged to better describe publicly
financed European universities.
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various forms of inefficiencies. In particular a program that exhibits an initially low quality may
overcome this disadvantage by building a sufficiently large network. If this is the case, we may
end up with two doctoral programs sharing the market. Or worse, we may end up with only
one program organized by a lower quality university.
Our analysis reveals that the presence of a quasi-market where universities actually com-
pete for students may be sufficient to prevent the inefficiencies arising from the co-existence
of two doctoral programs when students are sufficiently informed and coordinated. However,
competition may also yield subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes where the only doctoral pro-
gram is launched by the low quality university. This mere fact provides a rationale for public
intervention.
Interestingly enough, the concession of differentiating hallmarks certifying the high quality
of doctoral programs (known as Mencio´n de Calidad) has been recently introduced in Spain.
The information is made public and certain parties of the global budget to finance universities
(in particular those relative to the aid for mobility of students and professors at the graduate
level) are subject to the concession of this honorable mention.2 Although it is not a requirement,
it does rise the costs associated to a doctoral program for lower quality universities. Hence, our
model provides a possible rationale for this initiative. A comparable, though even more striking,
disposition in now in force in Belgium. Indeed, the brand new Decree organizing higher education
in the French Speaking Community explicitly states that, for each scientific domain, one and
only one institution can be accredited to organize doctoral courses.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model and discusses the first best
allocation of students to graduate programs. Section 3 studies, respectively, the admission
2Bolet´ın Oficial del Estado, Orden 18 de Noviembre de 2002, Ministerio de Educacio´n, Cultura y Deportes.
17 de Diciembre de 2002. http://www.boe.es
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subgames taking place between two master programs, a doctoral school at the high quality
university in competition with a master at the low quality university, a doctoral school at the
low quality university in competition with a master at the high quality university, and two
doctoral programs. In section 4, we solve the first stage of the game: the choice of program.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
There is a continuum of graduate students of mass 1 and verifiable ability a uniformly distributed
in [a−, a+] with a− > 0 . We assume for simplicity that a+−a− = 1 . Student utility depends on
the productivity gained through the program, which is a function of own ability, a, the quality of
the university qi and the number of enrolled fellow-students ni . The parameter βj measures the
size of this effect where j stands for the type of program, that can be a master program, m, or a
doctoral program, d. Due to the characteristics of the programs we assume βd > βm. Finally, f
is the university fee, that we assume exogenous and independent of the type of program. Student
utility is therefore
Uj = aqi + βjni − f with j = m, d. (1)
Given the program types and limiting admission abilities (or grades) chosen by the uni-
versities, we assume that each student plays a game where the strategy space is defined by 2
strategies: ”enrolling at A” and ”enrolling at B”. A student payoff is determined by (1) and
obviously depends on the other students’ choice through ni. The basic equilibrium concept is
the customary one: no single student has an incentive to deviate, moving to another school
given the others’ strategy.
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We normalize for simplicity βm to zero and let βd = β.3
There are two universities A and B with established quality q with qA > qB.4 They both
operate in the undergraduate market. At some point, they face the opportunity of launching a
new program at the graduate level.
There are two options with respect to the organization of such a program:
(i) extend the existing structure by adapting the teaching load of the existing type of lecturers
(and probably hiring more). The required lecturer/student ratio is assumed to be exoge-
nously given. We assume that it is always possible to hire these lecturers at wage wm.5
Hence, the cost of giving this graduate diploma to n students is Cm(n) = nwm.
(ii) create a doctoral program, which essentially requires the set up of a research center, with
specific professors (exhibiting serious publication records). We assume the following pref-
erences of a research professor:
v(w, qi) = w + φqi (2)
The key idea is that the willingness to accept a position is positively related to the quality,
or prestige, of the university. Assuming that professors have reservation utility u we can
solve the participation constraint w ≥ u and obtain
wd[qi] = u− φqi (3)
The corresponding cost structure is Cd(n, qi) = nwd[qi] where d stands for doctoral pro-
gram, and wd[qi] is the minimum wage a research professor will demand when the quality
of the university is qi.
3This assumption simplifies the analysis and is meant to capture the idea that the network effects we consider
(rooted in research spillovers) are more prevalent in the course of a doctoral program than a master one.
4This initial quality differential is best understood as resulting from established reputation inherited from the
past.
5Given the fixed lecturer/student ratio, we express the wage in per student terms.
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Regarding the payoff of the universities we assume the following objective function:
Pi = γni(f + ai − wd[qi]) + (1− γ)ni(f − wm) (4)
where γ is a dummy variable summarizing choices made at the first stage of the game. If a
doctoral program is launched we have γ = 1. If a master program is instead implemented we
have γ = 0. ai is the average ability of students enrolled at university i. The universities
maximize their payoffs by setting a limiting admission ability or grade ai. Only students with
ability above this threshold are offered admission. The analysis will be developed using the
following assumption:
Assumption 1 wm < f < wd[qA]
This assumption ensures on the one hand that, as far as a master program is concerned,
enrolling students yields a positive payoff and, on the other hand, that, as far as a doctoral
program is concerned, a university’s incentive is not to enroll as many students as possible. This
assumption is best viewed as a shortcut for describing the functioning of european higher educa-
tion quasi-markets where positive per student margins are possibly levied on master enrollments
but not on doctoral ones. Thus, we assume that if it launches a doctoral program, the university
is mainly concerned by a reputation effect which depends on the average quality of the students
it enrolls. In case it launches a master program, the objective consists of maximizing a monetary
surplus.
Notice that universities are different ex ante: A benefits from an initial advantage because of
its higher quality. Moreover, this comparative advantage is even reinforced with respect to the
doctoral school choice since the higher quality allows for hiring professors at a lower wage. Last,
our specification of the universities’ preferences in case γ = 1 ensures that a doctoral program
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in which only students with low abilities enroll is less desirable from the point of view of a
university. Taken together, these assumptions make a very bad case for the co-existence of two
doctoral programs and put moreover university B at a systematic disadvantage. As will appear
later, putting more symmetry into the model would only reinforce the arguments we develop
hereafter.
Before turning to the analysis of the decentralized choices, let us briefly discuss what would
the first best allocation of students to graduate programs look like under our assumptions.
We assume that a social planner is mainly concerned by the total welfare accruing to students,
net of the wage costs. This in particular implies that the social planner positively values the
network effect in the measure that it raises student utility. As a result, it is never optimal to
have students divided between two doctoral programs and, given her quality advantage, only
university A should launch a doctoral program, if any is to be launched.
In absence of doctoral school, this quality differential also implies that all students should
attend the master program launched by A.
There is thus only one relevant case where the two universities should be active at the first
best: A launches a doctoral program and enrolls the best students while B launches a master
program in which the less able students are enrolled.
3 Admission requirements subgames
In this section we analyze the optimal decisions of universities after they have committed to
the type of program they launch. Recall that we assume that their decision variable is the
limiting admission grade at which they enroll applicants. Therefore, their strategies at this
stage of the game are ai ∈ [a−, a+]. In order to solve the admission subgames we shall assume
8
that universities play in sequence: university A is assumed to play first.6 Recall also that
students make their choice after having observed universities’ choices. A representative student
will therefore optimally choose where to enroll among the set of universities at which he is
admissible. Since fees are assumed to be identical across programs, their level is irrelevant
for students’ decisions. These choices result in a particular equilibrium allocation of students.
Because of the network effect at work within doctoral programs, such an equilibrium may not
be unique for a given pair of strategies (aA, aB).
Given the choices made in the first stage, there are four different subgames to analyze in the
second stage. We consider each of them in turn in the next subsections.
3.1 Two master programs compete for students
The utility of a student when attending each university is given by UA = aqA and UB = aqB for
all a ∈ (a−, a+). All students prefer university A since qA > qB. The market partition will then
be determined by the choice of limiting admission grade by A. If aA > aB the two universities
share the market (SA). If, on the other hand, aA ≤ aB, university A will be alone in the market.
Universities maximize (4) with γ = 0. Clearly, a∗A = a
∗
B = a
− as long as f > wm. Since
university A is preferred by all students, A enrolls all students and B receives a nil payoff.
Lemma 1 If the two universities have launched a master program, in any equilibrium of the
corresponding subgame, university A enrolls all students with type a ∈ [a−, a+]. The equilibrium
payoff of university B is zero.
6This assumption is made for technical reasons. As will appear from later discussion, it matters only in the
case where two doctoral schools coexist.
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3.2 A doctoral program at A competes with a master program at B
University A now benefits from an advantage both in terms of quality and the network exter-
nality. Accordingly, all students prefer university A whatever the strategies chosen by A and
B. The equilibrium partition of the students is therefore straightforward. If aA > aB, students
with type a ≥ aB enroll at A whereas those with type a ∈ [aB, aA] enroll at B. Students with
type a < aB do not enroll at any graduate program. If aA ≤ aB all students with type a ≥ aA
enroll at A whereas the rest do not attend any graduate program.
Whatever the strategy of university A, university B sets aB∗ = a−. University A maximizes
(4) with γ = 1. Thus, aA∗ = wd[qA]− f .
Assumption 2 wd[qi]− f > a− for i = A,B
Assumption (2) ensures that A is not willing to hire the less able type of student and thereby
leaves some room for the second university. Therefore, under this assumption, the two programs
coexist in equilibrium with positive payoffs.
Lemma 2 If university A has launched a doctoral program, B has launched a master and As-
sumption 2 holds, the unique admission equilibrium is characterized by (wd[qA] − f, a−). Both
universities enjoy a positive payoff in equilibrium.
3.3 A doctoral program at B competes with a master program at A
The optimal allocation of students is less straightforward to identify in this subgame because if
B enrolls a sufficiently large number of students, it can overcome its quality disadvantage and
provide students with higher utility than A thanks to the positive network externality. Stated
differently: one cannot specify the relative preferences of a student over the two programs
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independently of the strategies of the universities and the choices of the other students. When
aA > aB it can be now that the two universities share the market (when A is preferred) or that B
is preferred and has the monopoly. The same applies symmetrically to aA ≤ aB. We now check
when each configuration is a candidate equilibrium in the sense that, provided that students are
thus allocated, none of them is interested in moving to the other program. Student utility when
attending each school is given by UA = aqA and UB = aqB + βnB for all a ∈ (a−, a+).
3.3.1 Equilibrium distributions of students between programs
We consider in turn each possible allocation of students between A and B. We distinguish
two configurations: market sharing where both universities enroll a positive number of students
(which we denote Si), and monopoly, where only one program enrolls students (which we denote
M i). The superscript i = A,B identifies the university enrolling the students with higher types.
A takes the best and B chooses among leftovers: SA
For this market partition to constitute an equilibrium allocation, all students accepted by
A must prefer A. A sufficient condition for this to be true is that the last admitted by A, who
derives the lowest utility among all students enrolled at A, prefers A’s master program rather
than B’s doctoral program. For this to be the case, we need that
aAqA ≥ aAqB + β(aA − aB)⇔ aA(∆q − β) ≥ −βaB (5)
This is always true if ∆q ≤ β. This last expression is best understood we re-expressed as
qA ≥ qB + β (6)
Condition 6 characterizes a weak network effect. Under a weak network effect, university B is
not able to overcome the initial quality differential, even when enrolling all the students, i.e.
even when the size of the network effect is maximized. We shall speak of a strong network effect
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in the opposite case where ∆q < β. Notice that the intensity of the network effect is relative
to the quality differential: the lower the quality differential, the larger the effectiveness of the
network effect.
As it will soon be clear, inefficiencies are associated in our model to the presence of a strong
network effect. We shall therefore concentrate in this case.
Under a strong network effect, condition (5) is satisfied if and only if
aA ≤ βa
B
β −∆q = f(a
B) (7)
If this last condition is not satisfied, then B is willing to enroll a sufficiently large number of
students so as to overcome the quality disadvantage by means of the network effect. As a result,
all students prefer B, who has the monopoly of graduate education.
B takes the best and leaves no room to A: MB
For this configuration to define an equilibrium allocation, we need again that no student
be better off by changing to the other university. In this case, it is sufficient that the student
who would most benefit from attending the master program at university A (i.e. the most able
student) is better off at the doctoral program in university B (if she prefers B, then all do):
a+qA ≤ a+qB + β(a+ − aB)
This is impossible if ∆q > β : under a weak network effect, the most able students clearly derive
more utility from the master program at A and, therefore, aA > aB necessarily implies in this
case that the two universities share the market. If ∆q < β, the condition is guaranteed by the
limiting admission grade chosen by B being such that
aB ≤ a
+(β −∆q)
β
= aˆ (8)
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In other words, if B enrolls a sufficiently large number of students, its doctoral program will
monopolize the graduate education market.
A takes the best and leaves no room to B: MA
This configuration may define an equilibrium allocation if the utility of the last admitted at
A is larger than it would be at B (considering that nobody is enrolled there). Since qA > qB this
is always the case. If A chooses to accept enough applications it will always keep the monopoly
of graduate education in spite of not having a doctoral program. The reason is that there will
not be enough students left in the market so that B can overcome its quality disadvantage by
means of the network externality.
B takes the best and A chooses among leftovers: SB
The student who would most benefit from the master program at A needs to be better off
there than at the doctoral program in B. The condition for this to be an equilibrium is (8).
Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 summarizes the set of candidate equilibria corresponding to the universities choice of
limiting admission grade when B launches a doctoral program and A a master. If ∆q > β
university A is always preferred by students. Then, the market will be shared if aA > aB and,
otherwise, it will be monopolized by the master program at A. If, on the other hand, ∆q < β,
a sufficiently low admission requirement at university B (aB < aA and aB < aˆ) guarantees
that a monopoly at university B constitutes an equilibrium allocation. Yet, if the admission
requirement at A is also low (aA < f(aB)) SA also constitutes an equilibrium when aB < aA
and aB < aˆ.7 Once the students are distributed in either way, no single student has an incentive
7The rest of the figure is interpreted in a similar way. The calculations required to correctly place f(aA) in
the limiting admissions grades space can be found in the Appendix.
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to change. This multiplicity of equilibria is common in the presence of network externalities.
Notice, indeed, that even if all the students are better off in one of the two allocations, they
could remain stuck in the dominated one if this one realizes, since no student will improve her
payoff by moving alone. For this reason we propose a refinement of the equilibrium concept.
3.3.2 Refinement of the equilibrium concept
Suppose a group of students is better off under one of the equilibria rather than the other.
Then, it is reasonable to argue that a coalition will be formed by these students, who, by jointly
deviating, will destroy the latter. When there is more than one equilibrium, we shall keep only
those which are robust to deviations by coalitions.8
When aA > aB there are two equilibria : MB and SA. This implies that, in any case,
students with ability a ∈ (aB, aA) attend university B. The question now is to verify whether
students with ability a ∈ (aA, a+) are better off at B with the students that always enroll there
or at A forming a selected group. Recall that A does not have a doctoral program. Then, if
aqA < aqB+β(a+−aB) for all a ∈ (aA, a+), the equilibrium MB is preferred. For this to be the
case, it is sufficient that it is true for a = a+, since this is the student who derives the highest
utility at A. If she is better off at B then everybody is:
a+qA < a
+qB + β(a+ − aB)⇔ aB ≤ a
+ (β −∆q)
β
= aˆ
which is the case in the relevant area. Then M b is preferred.
If aA < aB, the two possible equilibria are MA and SB. This implies that students with
a ∈ (aA, aB) enroll at university A. If, for all students with ability a ∈ (aB, a+), aqA <
aqB + β(a+− aB) then these students will be better off at the SB equilibrium. Once again, it is
enough that B is preferred by the students with a = a+. We know that this is indeed the case.
8We thank Francis Bloch for suggesting this insightful exercise.
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Figure 2 reflects the new equilibrium partitions when ∆q < β (to be compared to the right
hand side of Figure 1). The equilibrium is unique and ensures the leading role of the low quality
university provided that aB ≤ aˆ.
Figure 2 about here
Obviously, provided that the network effect enjoyed only by the doctoral program at B is
large, students’ welfare is larger at this university because the size of the network effect more
than overcomes the quality disadvantage. We are now in a position to characterize optimal
decisions by the universities.
3.3.3 Choice of limiting admission grades by universities
University A is not interested in student ability and will accept every application. Accordingly,
aA∗ = a−.
University B has launched a doctoral program. Thus, it maximizes (4) with γ = 1. This
university is thus willing to enroll every student with ability a ≥ wd[qB]− f = aB∗.
Yet, if wd[qB] − f > aˆ as defined by equation (8) there exist no equilibrium allocations
for students such that some would like to enroll in this doctoral program. The reason is that
admissions at B are too low for the network effect to overcome the quality disadvantage. The
master program is thus preferred by all students.
For B to actually run her doctoral program, we then either need that
1. aB∗ ≤ aˆ, or
2. aB = aˆ generates a positive payoff for university B. This will be the case provided that
nB(
a+ + aˆ
2
− wd[qB] + f) > 0⇔ aB∗ = wd[qB]− f < aˆ+ a
+
2
(9)
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Lemma 3 If university A has launched a master program while B has launched a doctoral one,
network effects are strong and Assumption 2 holds, aB∗ = wd[qB] − f < aˆ+a+2 is sufficient for
the unique equilibrium to be characterized by (a−,Min
{
wd[qB]− f, aˆ
}
). The payoffs are positive
for the two universities.
3.4 Two doctoral schools
In this section we study the subgame corresponding to two doctoral programs in the market.
As in the previous section, we first search for equilibrium partitions of demand among schools
when both universities launch a doctoral school. Then, we refine the equilibrium concept and,
last, we study the choice of limiting admission grade by the universities.
As before, B could overcome the disadvantage in quality by enrolling a sufficiently large
number of students, provided that the network effect is strong. Student utility when attending
each school is given by UA = aqA + βnA and UB = aqB + βnB for all a ∈ (a−, a+).
3.4.1 Equilibrium distributions of students between programs
A enrolls the best, then B chooses among leftovers: SA
The last admitted at A has to be better off at A than at B. This will be true if and only if
aAqA + β(a+ − aA) ≥ aAqB + β(aA − aB)
aA ≤ β(a
B + a+)
2β −∆q = h(a
B)
If aA < h(aB), the two doctoral programs share the market, with A enrolling the most able
students (SA). Otherwise, A’s limiting admission grade is too high and B, enrolling more
students, overcomes the initial disadvantage in terms of quality due to the network externality.
Therefore, B has the monopolistic doctoral program.
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B takes the best and leaves no room to A: MB
The admission requirements at B are so lax that the disadvantage in quality is overcome by
size. There is no room for A. The most able student, who would derive the largest benefit from
deviation, must prefer to stay at B for this configuration to be an equilibrium. If a+ is better
off at B, then all students are. Therefore
a+qB + β(a+ − aB) > a+qA ⇔ aB < aˆ
A takes the best and leaves no room for B: MA
It can also be the case that A accepts so many applications that it leaves no room for B to
make up for its quality disadvantage. For this equilibrium configuration to be stable we need
that no student able to enroll at B be willing to do so alone. Since A has both the quality and
network advantage, aqB < aqA + β(a+ − aA) for all a if aA < aB.
B takes the best then A chooses among leftovers: SB
As before, B needs to overcome its quality disadvantage by enrolling a sufficiently large
number of students. Now, however, some room is left to A, who also has a doctoral program.
For such configuration to be an equilibrium it is sufficient that the student who would derive
the largest benefit from attending A is better off at B :
a+qB + β(a+ − aB) > a+qA + β(aB − aA)⇔ aB < a
Aβ − a+ (∆q − β)
2β
= g(aA)
Figure 3 summarizes as before the set of candidate equilibria depending of the universities choices
of limiting admission grade when both have a doctoral program and the network effect they
both enjoy is strong. 9
Figure 3 about here
9As before, the calculations for the correct placement of h(aB) and g(aA) can be found in the Appendix.
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3.4.2 Refinement of the equilibrium concept
As in the case where only B has a doctoral program, we have multiple equilibria for certain
parameter configurations. As we did before, we now refine the equilibrium concept requiring
that no coalition can be formed that, by deviating would secure more welfare to its members.
We first identify the conditions for a multiplicity of equilibria to be feasible in Figure 3.
With aA > aB, when aA < h(aB) and aB < aˆ, there are two equilibria, denoted by MB and SA.
This implies that students with ability a ∈ (aB, aA) join university B. If, for all a ∈ (aB, a+)
aqA + β(a+ − aA) > aqB + β(a+ − aB)⇔ aA < a
Bβ
β −∆q = v(a
B)
then SA is better for all these students.
Note that v(aB) < h(aB) ⇔ aB < aˆ, which is true in the relevant area. Note also that the
line v(aB) has slope larger than 1 and that, at aB = aˆ, it equals a+. Therefore, the equilibrium
refinement enlarges the area where MB is the unique equilibrium.
For MB to be preferred, in turn, it is sufficient that the student with ability a+ prefers the
program at B, which is the case if
aA >
aBβ + a+∆q
β
= z(aB)
The line z(aB) has slope equal to 1, larger than that of h(aB) but smaller than that of v(aB).
Also, z(aˆ) = a+. As a result, there is an area in which either configuration may be preferred :
the multiplicity of equilibria remains possible (see Figure 4).
Figure 4 about here
In contrast, when aA < aB the two equilibria are MA and SB. This implies that students of
ability a ∈ (aA, aB) attend university A in either case. As for students with a ∈ (aB, a+), if
aqA + (a+ − aA) > aqB + β(a+ − aB)
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they will be better off at MA. Since qA > qB and aA < aB this is always the case. Therefore,
the equilibrium configuration MA is unique.
Refining the equilibrium concept has allowed us to reduce the scope for multiplicity of equi-
libria when the two universities choose to launch a doctoral program, but we have not been able
to eliminate this possibility in this case. When admission levels are located in the shaded area
of Figure 4, the allocation where students are split between the two universities is robust to
coalitional deviations because those students who are likely to deviate are the best ones. Ac-
cordingly, if they moved to university B they would gain from a larger network effect but they
would also suffer from the quality downgrading. On their side, students assigned to B simply
are not admissible at A. But, on the other hand, the allocation where all students enroll at
B is also robust to coalitional deviations, since, for those students who would move to A, the
loss of a bigger network effect is too large as compared to the benefits of the quality upgrade.
This existence of multiple equilibria complicates the analysis of the decentralized choices of the
universities. We can however show that no equilibrium takes place in the region where multiple
equilibria prevail.
3.4.3 Choice of limiting admission grades by universities
We first identify the optimal choice of limiting admission grade by university B, given A’s choice.
a) If aA < v(a−) = a
−β
β−∆q the two possible equilibrium configurations are, according to Figure
4, SA (aB < aA) and MA (otherwise). Suppose that A is playing the admission level that
maximizes her payoff aA∗ < v(a−). In this case, the payoff for B is:
nB(
aA∗ + aB
2
+ f − wd[qB]) > 0⇔ aB > wd[qB]− f + wd[qB]− wd[qA] > aB∗
But we know that aB∗ > aA∗ and aA∗ > aB (otherwise A would have the monopoly).
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Thus the resulting payoff for B is negative in the relevant range. Accordingly, B is better
off setting an admission grade above aA∗ to ensure that it will not have to enroll any
student. In this case, any pair (aA∗, aB) with aB > aA∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The resulting payoff for B is 0 in this case. As will be made clear shortly, A may be
constrained to play aA < aA∗. B’s payoff is then even lower at SAand the same argument
yields MA as the equilibrium outcome.
b) If, on the other hand, aA > z(a−) = a
+∆q
β + a
−, a similar argument shows that the
configuration SA involves losses for B. Therefore, B will choose aB so as to get the
monopoly, provided the payoff is then positive. Indeed, given the above analysis, it is clear
that a sufficient condition for this strategy to be profitable is that the payoff of B in this
region is positive. Solving the expression a
++aB
2 + f − wd[qB] ≥ 0 for aB yields
aB ≥ 2aB∗ − a+ ⇔ aB∗ ≤ a
B + a+
2
Assumption 3 aB∗ = wd[qB]− f < a−+a+2
Assumption 3 guarantees that it is always profitable forB to have the monopoly of graduate
education with a doctoral program. Note that this assumption is stronger than the one
guaranteing a positive payoff to B when it is the only one launching a doctoral program
(Lemma 3).
c) Finally, for choices of A such that v(a−) < aA < z(a−) two equilibria are possible when
aB < aA. If given these announcements on the universities’ admission policies, students
allocate themselves at the third stage according to SA we are in a). If they allocate
themselves according to MB we are in b). Clearly, the former case is more suitable for A
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and we shall concentrate on it.10
Consider now the optimal strategy for university A. We take as a benchmark the optimal
admission level for aA when it acts as the unique doctoral school. We know by now that (4) is
maximized at aA∗ = wd[qA]−f . Two cases may then occur. Either aA∗ ≤ z(a−) or aA∗ > z(a−).
If the first case prevails, A plays its optimal monopoly strategy and there is no possible
admission level for B that would lead him into the region where the unique equilibrium student
allocation is MB (see Figure 4). We have already seen that, under these circumstances, B will
experience losses if it takes leftovers from A. Accordingly, B is better off setting an admission
grade above aA to ensure that it will not have to enroll any students. In this case, any pair
(aA∗, aB) with aB > aA∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium. The resulting payoff for B is 0 in
this case.
Suppose instead that aA∗ = wd[qA]− f > z(a−). Then, should A play aA∗, B would reply in
the region where is acts as a monopoly.
It follows that A will never choose aA > z(a−). When aA∗ lies in fact in that region,
university A will be constrained to set a lower admission level, in order to compel university B
from gaining the monopoly. Such admission level can never be higher than z(a−). Assumption
3 guarantees that it is profitable for A to do so, since wd[qA] < wd[qB].
We can now use the fact that aA∗ = wd[qA]− f > z(a−) to identify parameter constellations
under which the mere presence of a doctoral school at university B forces university A to accept
too many applications, which decreases its equilibrium payoff. Indeed,
aA∗ > z(a−)⇔ ∆q
β
<
aA∗ − a−
a+
10As noted before, we are simply trying to make it difficult for B to launch a doctoral school and yet prove
that this is possible due to the existence of network effects.
21
The quality differential hence needs to be low enough (or the network effect strong enough) for
A to be constrained by the existence of a doctoral program at B.
Moreover, although only one school is actually active, the lack of a master program implies
that leftovers do not enroll anywhere.
Lemma 4 If both universities have launched a doctoral program and network effects are strong,
∆q
β <
aA∗−a−
a+
and Assumption 3 holds, in any equilibrium outcome, university A sets aL = z(a−).
The payoff of university A is positive whereas the payoff of university B is zero.
Notice that in order to obtain Lemma 4 we need to impose that universities play sequentially.
Should university play simultaneously, there would be no equilibrium in pure strategies for many
constellations of the parameters. This is easy to understand. Suppose A plays its limit admission
grade in order to prevent B to secure a monopoly. Then the best response for B consists in
avoiding to enroll any student by setting a large aB. However, if aB is large, then A should play
a∗, which would induce B to deviate downwards into the region where it is a monopoly. The lack
of a pure strategy equilibrium can be viewed as an alternative illustration of the competitive
pressure placed on A by the presence of a second doctoral program. Although we have not been
able to characterize the equilibrium payoff of A in this case, it is clearly less than the monopoly
one, and is decreasing when universities are more similar ex ante, i.e. when ∆q is low. This key
property is actually captured by the sequential equilibrium described in Lemma 4.11
4 The choice of program at the first stage
The analysis of the admission subgames reveals that the intensity of the network effect deeply
affects the outcome of university competition. On the one hand, the presence of a strong network
11As should be clear by now, the sequential structure we assume is important only in this last subgame. For
all other cases, the equilibrium under simultaneous and sequential moves is identical.
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effect allows university B to impose itself as the dominant player when it launches a doctoral
school against a master program. On the other hand, strong networks effects impose a negative
burden on university A when two doctoral schools are launched. Using the characterization of
the four admission subgames, we are now in a position to solve the first stage of the game where
universities choose which program they will launch. Recall that γi = 0 amounts to opt for a
master program, whereas γi = 1 stems for the choice of a doctoral program. Notice that, using
Lemmas 1 and 2, γB = 0 is not a best response against γA = 0. Moreover γB = 1 is not a best
response against γA = 1. In both cases indeed, university B obtains a zero payoff whereas it
secures a positive one by choosing a program different to the one launched by A. Accordingly,
universities will never launch two similar programs in a subgame perfect equilibrium.
It remains to be proved that γA = 0 is a best response for A against γB = 1 and γA = 1 is
a best response against γB = 0.
Concerning the former, notice that, according to Lemma 4, when condition network effects
are strong the mere presence of a doctoral school at B undermines the payoff accruing from a
doctoral program for A, even though this university will be the only active one in equilibrium.
Accordingly, it might well be the case that γA = 1 is not a best response against γB = 1. For
this to indeed be the case we need that the constrained payoff for A when it chooses to launch
a doctoral program given that B also does is smaller than her payoff when it launches instead
a master program:
(a+ − aL)(a
+ + aL
2
+ f − wd[qA]) < (aB∗ − a−)(f − wm) (10)
Finally, we need to check that against γB = 0 university A is better off when choosing
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γA = 1. A necessary and sufficient condition for this is the following:
f − wm < (a+ − aA∗)(a
+ + aA∗
2
+ f − wd[qA]) (11)
Combining these two conditions we may state our main result (see Appendix):
Proposition 1 If the initial quality differential is sufficiently small relative to the intensity of
the network effect, there exist two Subgame Perfect Equilibria. In these equilibria, universities
launch different graduate programs.
According to Lemma 4 and Proposition 1 competition among universities is sufficient to
eliminate the inefficiencies resulting from the co-existence of two doctoral programs.12 However,
competition is itself the driving force leading to the multiplicity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria.
Indeed, it is the presence of a fierce competition for students in case two doctoral schools would
coexist which may induce A to prefer launching a master program if B opts for a doctoral one.
The scope for public intervention is therefore grounded on the selection of the good equilib-
rium: the one in which the high quality university launches the doctoral program.
Under these circumstances, a hallmark certifying the quality of a program may prove useful
to select the most efficient equilibrium. The hallmark can be awarded to the best program alone
and be a requirement for a university to be able to launch a doctoral program. This is the way
the new Decree of the French Speaking Community of Belgium may work, as it states that,
for each scientific domain, one and only one institution can be accredited to organize doctoral
courses. But it need not be so restrictive.
In the Spanish case, the hallmark (Mencio´n de Calidad) is not a requirement, but some
12Notice that we focus here on structural inefficiencies, i.e. inefficiencies related to the prevailing structure of
the education quasi-market. Obviously, the equilibrium allocation of students will differ in any subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome from the first best one because of the universities’ specific objectives.
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parties of the university budget can be subject to its obtention. It can thus be interpreted as
an indirect measure aimed at increasing the initial quality differential, by certifying university
A’s quality and the additional funds it will have access to. Such a measure if effective in our
model. Recall indeed that the multiplicity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria arises only if the
quality differential is low enough in relation to the network effect. In this sense, awarding a
”Mencio´n de Calidad” may allow to eliminate the case for a strong network effect.
Another interpretation, related to budgetary implications of the Mencio´n de Calidad, could
be that it increases the opportunity cost of not launching doctoral program for the high quality
university. As a result, launching a master would become a dominated strategy for A and the
unique equilibrium would be that in which A has the doctoral program and B the master.
5 Concluding remarks: the role of a quality certifying hallmark
In this paper, we have analyzed some implications of network effects affecting students’ decisions
on the equilibrium structure of higher education markets. In particular we have focused on the
structural inefficiencies that could result from decentralized competition between universities
when deciding to launch a new program at the graduate level. Because of the quality differential,
it is clear that, in the absence of network effects, A would be the only active player in any
equilibrium, in accordance with the first best market structure. The presence of a network effect
essentially reinforces the scope for A’s dominance when the aim is to maximize student welfare
net of university costs.
However, in a decentralized setting, the network externality can induce just the opposite
result because it allows university B to play on size to overcome the quality differential. This
strategic implication of the network effect is effective whenever the quality differential is low
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enough relative to the network effect and implies that university B can launch a doctoral program
in a Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Fortunately, this equilibrium is not unique. For this reason,
public intervention should essentially aim at selecting the more desirable one. Measures in this
sense have been recently introduced both in Belgium and Spain. According to our analysis, both
can be effective in attaining this result.
Obviously, the presence of incomplete information is an alternative explanation
for the introduction of certification processes of this kind. Yet, we have shown
that, even with complete information, they may prove useful to induce the efficient
equilibrium in presence of network effects.
The analysis has been developed within quite a specific framework. Accordingly,
it is only fair to question the robustness of our results. In particular, a critical
assumption of the model is that universities do not value the network effect. Should
universities view the network effect as a positive externality, competition in the
admission games would become fiercer. This would only reinforce the incentives
for each university to avoid upfront competition without eliminating the possibility
that B launches the unique doctoral program in equilibrium. Should the network
effect affect universities negatively, this would essentially induce a doctoral school
to enroll less students , therefore leaving more room to the master program. Again
this is likely to increase the scope for multiple equilibria.
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Appendix
The Figures
In Figure 1:
f(aB) =
aBβ
β −∆q < a
+ ⇔ a+∆q < (a+ − aB)β
f(aB) =
aBβ
β −∆q > a
− ⇔ (aB − a−)β + a−∆q > 0 always since aB ≥ a−
f(aB) =
aBβ
β −∆q = a
+ ⇔ aB = a
+(β −∆q)
β
= â
In turn, â =
a+(β −∆q)
β
> a− ⇔ β > a+∆q.
In Figure 3:
h(aB) =
(aB + a+)β
2β −∆q < a
+ ⇔ a+∆q < (a+ − aB)β
h(aB) =
(aB + a+)β
2β −∆q > a
− ⇔ (aB − a−)β + β + a−∆q > 0 always since aB ≥ a−
h(aB) =
(aB + a+)β
2β −∆q = a
+ ⇔ aB = a
+(β −∆q)
β
= â
Finally, the slope of g(aA) is 1/2 and it cuts the 45 degree line at
g(aA) =
aAβ + a+(β −∆q)
2β
= aA ⇔ aA = a
+(β −∆q)
β
= â
Proof of Proposition 1
For an equilibrium in which B has a doctoral program and A a master we need
(a+ − aL)(a
+ + aL
2
+ f − wd[qA]) < (aB∗ − a−)(f − wm) (12)
In turn, for an equilibrium in which B has a master program and A a doctoral program a
necessary and sufficient condition for this is the following:
f − wm < (a+ − aA∗)(a
+ + aA∗
2
+ f − wd[qA]) (13)
Note first that, if wm = f (13) is always true and (12) never: the equilibrium is in this case
unique and efficient. If, on the other hand, the master was too profitable (wm very low) the
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unique equilibrium would be the inefficient one. For intermediate levels of wm both equilibria
exist. To see this, we combine (12) and (13) throgh f − wm
(a+ − aL)
(aB∗ − a−)(
a+ + aL
2
+ f − wd[qA]) < (a
+ + aA∗
2
+ f − wd[qA])
that we can write in terms of thresholds as
(a+ − aL)
(aB∗ − a−)(a
+ + aL − 2aA∗) < (a+ + aA∗ − 2aA∗)
which implies that it has to be the case that
aL < aA∗ ±
√
(a+ − aA∗)(1− (aB∗ − a−))
Since aL < aA∗ only the negative root is relevant. Hence, it has to be the case for the two
equilibria to exist that
aL =
a+∆q
β
− a− < aA∗ −
√
(a+ − aA∗)(1− (aB∗ − a−)) = a˜
where aA∗ = wd[qA] and aB∗ = wd[qB]. It is now straight forward to see that, while aL is smaller
the larger β relative to ∆q, a˜ is increasing in both wd[qA] and wd[qB] and therefore decreasing
in φ, the relative preference for quality in the professor’s utility function.
Figures and tables:
Figure 1
29
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
30
